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REVISITING TAIWAN’S DEFENSE STRATEGY
William S. Murray

C

hina’s recent military modernization has fundamentally altered Taiwan’s
security options. New Chinese submarines, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and, especially, short-range ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles have
greatly reduced Taiwan’s geographic advantage. Taipei can no longer expect to
counter Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner, with Patriot interceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Taiwan must therefore rethink and redesign its defense strategy,
emphasizing the asymmetrical advantage of being the defender, seeking to deny
the People’s Republic its strategic objectives rather than attempting to destroy its
weapons systems. This would enable Taipei to deter more effectively Beijing’s
use of coercive force, would provide better means for Taiwan to resist Chinese
attacks should deterrence fail, and would provide the United States additional
time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own
national interest. The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan’s
defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to
unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been increasingly explicit about its
military modernization objectives. China’s 2004 white paper on national
defense stated that “the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] will . . . enhance the development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force
and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and
1
warfighting capabilities.” The introduction of new classes of advanced surface
warships; the unveiling of new nuclear-powered submarines, tactical fighter aircraft, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with advanced warheads;
and an antisatellite demonstration—all attest to the determined pursuit of these
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goals. Many analysts believe that China’s near-term purposes are to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, to provide leverage by which to coerce a reunification with Taiwan if deterrence fails, and to inhibit or delay U.S.
3
intervention in such a conflict.
Chinese employment strategies for these new weapons systems and potential
capabilities remain unknown, though statements from senior leaders provide
important hints. For example, President Hu Jintao is said to have stated in August 2007 that China had five major military priorities relative to Taiwan: establishing military readiness, conducting demonstrative exercises, “imposing a
blockade on the Taiwan Strait,” “carrying out combined firepower attacks,” and
4
“[conducting a] cross-sea landing.” Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central
Military Commission, boasted in March 2008, “We have the resolve and capabil5
ity to deal with a major ‘Taiwan independence’ incident at any time.” The likely
use of force would encompass three components: long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade. These attack mechanisms would also likely
6
be conducted in close coordination, not independently. Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of how best to deny China the fulfillment of these objectives.
Previous studies of potential China-Taiwan conflict scenarios have concluded that Taiwan (either acting alone or with the assistance of the U.S. mili7
tary) could defeat PRC coercion, thus presumably ensuring reliable deterrence.
Several of these studies have asserted that the Second Artillery (the PRC’s strategic rocket force) possessed only a limited inventory of relatively inaccurate
short-range missiles with which to attack Taiwan, restricting its role to what
Robert Pape calls “coercion by punishment,” terrorizing or inflicting pain on the
8
population—a strategy that observers like Pape argue is rarely successful. These
circumstances, however, have now changed profoundly. Over the past decade
China has greatly enhanced its capacity to “reach” Taiwan with far more accurate
and decisive capabilities, and recent analyses question Taiwan’s near-term abil9
ity to resist coercive force.
For example, the PRC’s expanding arsenal of increasingly accurate ballistic
missiles can quickly, and with complete surprise, cripple or destroy high-value
military assets, including aircraft on the ground and ships at piers. This emergent capability, plus the acquisition of long-range surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), suggests that the PRC has shifted its anti-Taiwan military strategy away
from coercion by punishment toward denying Taiwan the use of its air force and
10
navy. Taiwan therefore faces a threat against which it has not adequately prepared and that offers the PRC a real prospect of achieving success before the
United States could intervene. This is a very worrisome development.
Taiwan’s responses to China’s enhanced capabilities remain highly conflicted,
a situation that reflects the deep political disagreements that shape Taipei’s

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

3

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 3, Art. 3
MURRAY

15

military policies. Taipei decreased its defense budgets in absolute and relative
11
terms from 1993 until 2003, with only meager improvements thereafter. These
diminished efforts hardly seem commensurate with the increased threat that
Taiwan confronts. They suggest either a state of denial about the threat, a
gridlocked political system, misplaced faith in current systems and geographic
advantages, or perhaps most disturbingly, a belief that the United States is certain to provide timely military assistance. Despite this ambivalence and its anemic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United
States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile systems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and
diesel submarines. Taiwan is also reportedly attempting to develop offensive
counterstrike capabilities indigenously, including the 360-mile-range
Hsung-Feng IIE cruise missile.
Both approaches represent serious misperceptions of the threats posed to
Taiwan and a misallocation of budgetary resources. The PAC-3s and other potential purchases are expensive, and they concentrate Taiwan’s defense dollars
on a limited range of capabilities that China is increasingly able to defeat. Offensive counterstrike weapons, furthermore, are potentially destabilizing, since
China would have difficulty determining if such strikes originated from American or Taiwanese platforms. They are also unlikely to be acquired in numbers
12
sufficient to deter China.
More affordable, more effective, and less destabilizing means of defense
against precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade are nonetheless available, but to take advantage of them, Taiwan must rethink its defense strategies.
Rather than trying to destroy incoming ballistic missiles with costly PAC-3
SAMs, Taiwan should harden key facilities and build redundancies into critical
infrastructure and processes so that it could absorb and survive a long-range
13
precision bombardment. Rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither
of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan
should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with
mobile, short-range, defensive weapons. To withstand a prolonged blockade,
Taiwan should stockpile critical supplies and build infrastructure that would allow it to attend to the needs of its citizens unassisted for an extended period. Finally, Taiwan should eschew destabilizing offensive capabilities, which could
include, in their extreme form, tactical nuclear weapons employed in a
countervalue manner, or less alarmingly, long-range conventional weapons
aimed against such iconic targets as the Three Gorges Dam.
Such shifts constitute a “porcupine strategy.” They would offer Taiwan a way
to resist PRC military coercion for weeks or months without presuming imme14
diate U.S. intervention. This shift in strategy might also be less provocative to
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the PRC than Taiwan’s current policy of offensive defense. A porcupine strategy
would enhance deterrence, in that a Taipei truly prepared to defend itself would
be able to thwart a decapitation attempt—thereby discouraging Beijing from
acting militarily. Perhaps most important, such a policy would allow the United
States time to deliberate whether intervention was warranted. Washington
could avoid a reflexive decision that would draw it into a war against a major
power that had systematically prepared for just such a contingency for more
than a decade.
This article has five principal parts. The first summarizes the history and rationale of the 2001 U.S. arms offer to Taiwan and explains why the weapons sales
proposed are unsuited to the effective defense of the island. The second section
outlines how China would probably attempt to destroy or neutralize the Taiwan
air force and navy, and it proposes an alternative strategy for countering China’s
increasingly precise short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and
manned tactical aircraft. The third part explores how Beijing’s invasion options
would change if Taipei lost its navy and the use of its air force. The fourth section
examines PRC blockade options against Taiwan and suggests how Taiwan could
more effectively deny China its blockade objectives. The concluding section
considers the impediments to, and repercussions of, adoption by Taiwan of a
“porcupine defense.”
WHATEVER IT TAKES: THE 2001 U.S. ARMS SALE OFFER
In April 2001, reversing twenty years of American policy, the George W. Bush
administration offered to provide to Taiwan eight diesel submarines for U.S.
15
$12.3 billion. This was part of a larger offer that also included six batteries of
PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for an additional $4.3 billion and twelve P-3C
16
maritime patrol and antisubmarine aircraft at $1.6 billion. This potential sale
evoked predictably strong opposition from the mainland, stirred extensive internal Taiwanese debate, and brought significant American pressure on Taiwan
17
to assent to these purchases. For example, Richard Lawless, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that “the passage of this
18
budget is a litmus test of Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense”; he also
19
warned Taipei of “repercussions” if it failed to approve the arms purchase.
20
One early version of the proposal also envisioned Taiwan buying new P-3Cs.
This would have required restarting a production line that had closed in 1990, at a
21
cost of some $300 million per plane. Many in Taiwan viewed the totality of this
22
package as exorbitant. Indeed, the leader of Taiwan’s People First Party likened it to
23
extortion by American mafiosi in exchange for protection from Chinese thugs.
The combination of high cost and intense divisiveness produced political theater
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and gridlock; proposals to fund the package were defeated some sixty times be25
tween 2004 and 2007. Six bitter years of stonewalling, stalemate, and wrangling
finally ended in June 2007 with passage of watered-down legislation allocating a
billion dollars to purchase rebuilt P-3 aircraft and upgrade Taiwan’s existing SAM
26
systems of the less advanced PAC-2 type, probably to PAC-3 standards. The Legislative Yuan, however, allocated only about six million dollars to fund continued feasibility studies on the U.S. diesel submarine deal, thereby postponing or
27
even killing it.
The military rationale underlying the original arms package was one of a classic symmetrical response to perceived threats. Thus the P-3C Orion aircraft,
which specialize in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and open-ocean surveillance,
could defend Taiwan from China’s modernizing fleet of diesel and nuclear submarines. Similarly, eight modern diesel submarines would presumably defend
against the PRC’s increasingly impressive and capable surface forces and submarines. Finally, the PAC-3 would seemingly offer a viable defense for critical targets against Beijing’s expanding inventory of short-range ballistic missiles,
attack aircraft, and highly accurate land-attack cruise missiles.28 Yet closer analysis suggests that none of these three weapons systems serve Taiwan’s current or
immediate future defense needs, that each would be acutely vulnerable to existing Chinese weapons and for Taipei would therefore be a major misallocation of
resources. To support this conclusion I will review the presumed role of various
potential capabilities in relation to the likely employment of Chinese
capabilities.
PAC-2 and PAC-3 SAMs versus China’s SRBMs
Taiwan clearly faces a major challenge in defending against Chinese short-range
ballistic missiles. In 2005 Taiwan had an inventory of approximately two hundred earlier PAC-2 interceptors in three batteries.29 Each PAC battery consists of
a multifunction phased-array radar, an engagement control station, communications gear, and eight launchers with four missiles per launcher, plus one reload
each. In theory, these three batteries of PAC-2 missiles could destroy up to 192
(that is, 3 × 8 × 4 × 2) Chinese SRBMs. SAM firing doctrine, however, mandates
30
shooting two missiles against each target to increase the odds of success. The
downside of this enhanced kill probability is that it effectively halves the inventory of interceptors and doubles the cost of each attempted intercept. Unless Taiwan were to increase its inventory of PAC missiles hugely, it can
expect to shoot down with the PAC-2 interceptors already in inventory at
most ninety-six of the SRBMs targeted against it, or as many as 192 if Taipei
upgrades all its current PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 capabilities (which have
sixteen missiles per launcher). Even this would allow over nine hundred of
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China’s 2007 inventory of a thousand SRBMs to arrive unchallenged at their
targets.
Patriot interceptors are useless unless guided by the PAC radar. China could
target these radars with SRBMs, cruise missiles, homing antiradiation missiles
fired from tactical aircraft, or even Harpy antiradar drones launched from the
mainland. Taiwan would then have to devote SAMs to defending the PAC radar,
thus reducing the number available for defending airfields, leadership sites, critical infrastructure, or other key facilities.
Additionally, a PAC-3 installation protecting a particularly valuable target
(e.g., Tsoying naval base) could be saturated and overwhelmed by large numbers
of SRBMs. China could also initially fire older, less precise weapons to deplete
Taiwan’s inventory of interceptors, following them closely with unimpeded precision attacks using more accurate missiles. Mark Stokes, a close observer of
China’s Second Artillery, also notes that Beijing may have “a terminal guidance
system that could preclude engagement by terminal missile defenses,” such as
31
Patriot interceptors.
One argument commonly used to dismiss the threat posed by SRBMs is that
the ballistic warheads lack the accuracy necessary for precision targeting. In a
2000 publication, for example, Michael O’Hanlon observed that the reported inaccuracy—a three-hundred-meter circular error probable (CEP)—of China’s
32
SRBMs made them little more than terror weapons. However, O’Hanlon derived that estimate from 1999 and earlier sources; since then China has greatly
improved the accuracy of its missiles, as well as the number in its inventory. Authoritative judgments are classified, but Thomas Christensen noted in 2001 that
internal PLA sources assumed that the Second Artillery would be able to support
33
accurate, concentrated attacks on enemy military assets. Jane’s in 2005 esti34
mated China was producing ballistic missiles with CEPs of forty meters. Mark
Stokes wrote in 2006 that “at least 10 years ago, PRC missile engineers had been
tasked to meet an accuracy requirement of below 50 meters circular error proba35
bility (CEP).” Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported in September
2007 that China’s SRBMs could strike within forty meters of their intended tar36
gets. The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides accuracy to within
a few meters over most of the earth’s surface, would be available to Beijing’s
37
weapons during all phases of launch and flight. Further, the U.S. Navy’s Office
of Naval Intelligence also reported in 2004 that China is building ballistic missiles that can target large ships at sea; in 2006 it stated that these maneuvering
warheads were guided by either infrared or radar seekers.38 These reports reflect
a growing consensus that China has mastered the engineering and manufacturing challenges involved in fielding highly accurate ballistic-missile warheads.
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China’s ballistic missiles are therefore no longer weapons for frightening populations but precision munitions. The Second Artillery’s SRBMs provide the PLA
the capability to destroy very large numbers of fixed targets with little or no
39
warning.
P-3s versus China’s Submarines
Taiwan’s purchase of P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft appears to make more
sense. P-3s have a proven capability to find submarines; China has a large submarine fleet, over fifty diesel and nine or more nuclear submarines; and Taiwan’s
40
1960s-vintage S-2 Tracker ASW aircraft is hopelessly obsolete. Japan, another
41
island state facing similar strategic imperatives, has up to 110 P-3s. In reality,
however, twelve P-3C aircraft will make little or no difference against China’s
submarine fleet. The reason is straightforward: P-3 aircraft require secure airfields from which to fly, but Taiwan will probably lose its airfields in the opening
salvos of any all-out war with China. Air superiority will be doubtful. Further, a
dozen P-3s can patrol only a fraction of the waters in which China’s submarines
could operate against Taiwan, and this fraction would be very likely reduced by
combat losses. Twelve P-3s will have meaningful reconnaissance and maritime
patrol roles to play during peacetime and scenarios of limited conflict, through
their ability to conduct wide-area searches, but they will have little wartime
utility.
Taiwan’s Diesel Submarines versus the People’s Liberation Army Navy
Diesel submarines can conduct effective operations against an opposing navy
and merchant fleet, but only when they are used offensively. Admittedly, there
are examples of diesel submarines effectively defending home or nearby waters.
One is the Argentine Type 209 diesel submarine that operated against the Royal
Navy during the 1982 Falklands War. Although making a number of attacks
against surface and submarine contacts, it failed to damage any British ships.
The Royal Navy, meanwhile, expended nearly its entire inventory of ASW weap42
ons against the boat without sinking or disabling it.
Conversely, there are many examples of effective employment of diesel submarines in offensive operations. The U.S., German, and British submarine
forces have all excelled offensively. Yet technological developments after World
War II dramatically altered the operational role of diesel submarines—they can
no longer prowl for targets at relatively high speeds on the surface, submerging
only to attack. Diesel submarines must now remain submerged, where their battery capacity forces them to hunt at low speeds—approximately four knots.
They must also transit slowly to locations where enemy vessels might eventually
deploy—geographic choke points, sea-lanes, and the waters around enemy harbors and naval bases being the most likely.
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It is also erroneous to view diesel submarines as effective antisubmarine systems. A diesel submarine can, if equipped with appropriate torpedoes, attack
another submarine, but modern submarines are very quiet and exceedingly difficult to detect. The Congressional Research Service, for example, reports that
some Kilo-class diesel submarines are quieter than improved Los Angeles–class
43
nuclear submarines. This suggests that properly maintained, modern diesel
submarines can be detected at ranges varying from two hundred yards to four
44
nautical miles. By maritime standards, these are very short distances. Diesel
submarines, therefore, cannot reasonably expect to find other quiet submarines
at long ranges.
Thus the importance of the low speeds of diesel submarines. If they can detect opponents only at ranges of a few miles, they will take a considerable
amount of time to search large areas effectively. Furthermore, the hunting diesel
submarine might well be itself detected and attacked by the hunted boat. Having
no marked advantages in detection range, search speed, or quietness over opponents, diesel submarines cannot hope to become effective ASW platforms. Diesel submarines are therefore really specialists in antisurface warfare, mining, and
intelligence gathering. These are all offensively oriented missions.
During a conflict, Taiwan would likely maximize the effectiveness of its submarines by either laying mines against Chinese ports or by attacking with torpedoes or cruise missiles warships leaving their bases. This would provide a much
higher probability of success against People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
vessels than would the defensive tactic of waiting in or around Taiwanese waters
for them. But China would have difficulty determining the origin of any resulting attacks and could attribute them to the United States, particularly any by
Mark 48 torpedoes, which were included in the 2001 arms sale offer and a vari45
ant of which is carried by American submarines. Such a contingency seems unnecessarily escalatory, especially since there are other, purely defensive and
nonescalatory, alternatives that could more quickly offer Taiwan equal or better
deterrence and at lesser cost.
TAIWAN’S VULNERABLE NAVY AND AIR FORCE
Taiwan’s navy could probably fight the PLAN effectively. It possesses highly advanced equipment, including four Kidd-class destroyers and Harpoon antiship
and SM-2 antiair missiles; its officers and men have a reputation for competence.46 In consequence, China can be expected to look for a way to defeat this
force decisively without a campaign of symmetrical, force-on-force attrition. A
surprise, long-range, precision bombardment on Taipei’s navy while it is in port
seems a clear choice. Beijing would need sufficient weapon accuracy, availability,
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and reliability, as well as targeting information, but all of these are now within
the PRC’s technical ability.
As mentioned above, problems of accuracy that used to characterize Beijing’s
long-range weapons have likely been solved. Accurate weaponry is useless without knowledge of the precise location of targets, but targeting Taiwan’s surface
combatants in port is increasingly easy. In the age of Google Earth, the latitude
and longitude of naval piers at Tsoying, Suau, and Taiwan’s other naval bases are
easy to determine exactly, and these piers are finite in number. Moreover, many
of Taiwan’s naval bases are also commercial ports, suggesting that direct observation of surface ships within them would be a simple matter. Ships in port
rarely shift berths, so Beijing could readily monitor the location of most, if not
all, of Taiwan’s surface combatants in port on a day-to-day basis.47
If Beijing knew that Taipei’s destroyers were tied up to a given pier, it could
readily program cruise or ballistic missiles to strike the appropriate aim points.
Even if jamming denies GPS and similar signals, technology like laser radar
48
guidance allows automatic target recognition. Deficiencies in accuracy can
also be compensated for by submunitions, which can damage targets within a
larger area. China has developed ballistic-missile-deployed submunitions since
49
at least 2000. Submunitions designed to penetrate and damage runways, which
China has almost certainly developed for its SRBMs, would also be highly effec50
tive against moored naval vessels.
Unclassified information regarding China’s weapons-system reliability is not
available. But technological shortfalls no longer plague China’s space program
or significantly retard its ability to manufacture dependable high-technology
consumer products such as memory chips, digital processors, digital cameras,
cell phones, or personal computers. China thus seems increasingly capable of
achieving adequate weapons-system reliability. Producing sufficient numbers of
weapons is also well within the PRC’s technical and budgetary capacities. Devoting, say, a hundred SRBMs to the destruction or crippling of Taiwan’s navy
would likely be a fruitful allocation of China’s inventory of precision weapons.
Taiwan’s air force is also threatened by long-range precision bombardment,
51
but by different means. The Taiwan air force has nine air bases, from which approximately 145 F-16, fifty-six Mirage 2000, and 131 F-CK-1A Indigenous De52
fense Fighters operate. An examination of the air bases using Google Earth
shows upward of four hundred protected revetments at these nine bases, approximately half of them covered and perhaps hardened.53 This gives credence to
the reports of underground hangars at Ta-Shan Air Base in Hualien that reportedly can protect over half of Taiwan’s tactical fighter aircraft. Other under54
ground shelters exist at Taitung Air Base and perhaps elsewhere. The table
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describes results of open-source satellite imagery examination of Taiwan’s air
bases.
TAIWAN’S AIR BASES

Air Base

Latitude/
Longitude

Runways
(Taxi)

Runway
Length ×
Width (ft)*

Warheads

Shelters

Revetments

Tunnels

Taoyuan

250319/
1211431

1 (1)

10,015 × 145

8

41

46

0

Hsinchu

244905/
1205621

1 (2)

11,955 × 148

12

43

11

0

Ta-Shan

240148/
1213629

1 (1)

7,959 × 140

5

0

0

8

Chashan

240109/
1213652

1 (2)

9,022 × 148

8

23

10

0

Chiayi

232747/
1202329

2 (1)

10,007 × 148
5,307 × 74

9

34

37

0

Tainan

225700/
1201220

2 (1)

10,007 × 148
10,007 × 148

8

43

50

0

Kangshan

224657/
1201553

2 (1)

8,019 × 145
7,435 × 145

6

4

0

0

Ching
Chuan
Kang

241525/
1203738

1 (2)

12,000 × 148

12

31

16

0

Taitung

241104/
1203914

1 (1)

11,055 × 147

8

29

0

12

Sungshan

250353/
1213303

1 (1)

8,578 × 197

5

0

0

0

Makung

243409/
1193747

1 (1)

9,843 × 148

8

4

8

0

89

252

178

20

Total

14 (14)

* Nearly all runway data in this table are taken from posted airport information on Google Earth. Information not provided was determined using Google Earth.

Any Chinese attempt to destroy individual aircraft in hardened shelters
would be hindered by the large number of targets. The Second Artillery might
have to devote at least one highly accurate unitary warhead to each covered aircraft revetment. This allocation of over two hundred missiles could be wasted,
however, if Taiwan did not place any aircraft in these revetments but instead
parked them in the open to defeat such targeting. Such dispersed aircraft, however, would be vulnerable to SRBM-delivered fragmenting submunitions. This
too would be an inefficient use of a potentially large percentage of the Second
Artillery’s short-range ballistic missiles, and neither method would threaten any
aircraft protected in underground shelters.
A better option for the Chinese would be to target the runways with warheads designed to crater them and so prevent Taiwan’s aircraft from taking off.55 For example, a
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loaded F-16 apparently requires approximately 2,500 feet of uninterrupted runway to take off; U.S. doctrine, however, demands a fifty-by-five-thousand-foot
56
minimum operating strip for tactical aircraft operations. Taiwan’s air bases
have fourteen runways ranging from 5,307 to 11,995 feet long, and these strips
are on average approximately 150 feet wide. If China’s SRBMs are sufficiently accurate and reliable, six unitary warheads each creating a fifty-foot crater could
cut a 12,000-by-148-foot runway into six segments, each smaller than a U.S.
57
minimum operating strip. Where taxiways could also serve as runways, they
would also have to be cratered. Using this logic, China would have to devote at
least eighty-nine perfectly accurate warheads (see the “warheads” column of the
table) to Taiwan’s runways and taxiways to prevent their use by tactical aircraft.
The PRC cannot rely on 100 percent SRBM reliability and accuracy, but something between a hundred and two hundred unitary warheads could deny Taiwan
the use of its air bases for a while. This number would be greater if accuracy and
reliability were poor and ballistic missile defenses were effective; conversely, it
could be smaller if China has runway-penetrating submunitions, tactical aircraft or cruise missiles can reliably deliver antirunway munitions, or fighter air58
craft require longer takeoff or landing distances than assumed.
China has reportedly acquired runway-penetrating bombs from Russian
59
sources. It also seems likely that the Second Artillery has developed
rocket-delivered warheads. A Google Earth image at 40°29'20" north latitude, 93°30'02" east longitude, depicts what is likely Chinese testing of a
concrete-penetrating submunition warhead. Mark Stokes asserts that in fact
the Second Artillery already has runway-penetrating submunitions, termi60
nally guided. In any case, there is little reason to doubt that China has developed
suitably accurate antirunway weapons to support such a campaign as envisioned
here. As a point in evidence, Taiwan recognizes that its runways present a critical
vulnerability and has acquired the ability to repair them rapidly under combat
61
conditions. Disturbingly, however, as late as 2007 at least one Taiwan airfield’s
runway repair capabilities consisted of “a pile of gravel and pile of sand at the
apex of the runways. Both piles were uncovered, exposed to the elements, and
obviously had been very long in place; furthermore, there was no earthmoving
62
equipment stored anywhere near the piles.” Effective rapid runway repair during sustained ballistic missile strikes requires highly trained and motivated
teams. If Taiwan has established and maintained such teams, it should be able to
keep some of its airfields operable. Observers might be forgiven doubts, however,
63
given other manning problems that afflict Taiwan’s military.
Among those problems is a shortage of pilots. For nearly a decade Taiwan has
struggled to maintain a ratio of one pilot to one modern fighter aircraft. Bernard
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Cole relates that Taiwan’s minister of defense has seriously considered mothball64
ing some of its Mirage 2000s in an effort to increase the pilot-to-plane ratio.
Attrition among pilots by any means would be a very serious matter.
Finally, Taiwan has on at least two occasions conducted exercises in which
65
tactical aircraft flew from highways. Yet this expedient incurs a host of logistics
problems, very low sortie rates, and increased vulnerabilities to traditional,
66
fifth-column, or PRC special operations forces attacks.
The key point is simple and sobering: the Second Artillery’s expanding inventory of increasingly accurate SRBMs probably allows Beijing to incapacitate
much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of the air force in
a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.
An Invitation to Invasion?
Hypothetical Chinese invasion fleets have always been presumed to risk devastation by Taipei’s highly regarded air force. Yet even if Taiwan’s fighters could take
to the air and conduct coordinated defensive operations after suffering a
long-range precision bombardment, they would still have to prevail against the
Chinese air force and navy’s growing inventory of fourth-generation Su-27,
Su-30, J-10, and J-11 aircraft, all with impressive antiair capabilities. Other mortal threats include Beijing’s four (soon to be eight) batteries firing the
land-based S-300 PMU2 surface-to-air missile, which with its 120-mile range
can reach nearly across the Strait of Taiwan and make penetration of China’s air67
space “difficult if not impossible” with F-16s and F-15s. This difficulty could
be exacerbated by the ninety-mile SA-20, which China is sending to sea on its
pair of Luzhou-class destroyers, and by the fifty-four-mile HHQ-9 SAMs on
68
both of its Luyang II destroyers. Combined, these weapons systems could effectively defend an invasion fleet against any tactical aircraft that got airborne.
It is also widely assessed that Beijing lacks the amphibious lift required to
conduct a successful invasion. A spate of recent mainland amphibious-ship construction, however, suggests that Beijing continues to pursue that option. The
launching and outfitting of the Yazhou-class landing ship (LPD) in 2006 and
2007 at Shanghai’s Hudong shipyard means that shortly an invasion fleet would
69
have helicopter and air-cushion-vehicle support. An additional invasion capability will be gained if China acquires from Russia the sixty-knot Zubr-class amphibious hovercraft, which can carry three main battle tanks, ten armored
personnel carriers, or 140 troops. Long-swirling rumors of the impending sale
70
of six or more are gaining credibility. Further, the ten Yuting-II tank landing
ships built during 2003 and 2004 increased China’s inventory of that type by ap71
proximately 50 percent. The total number of amphibious vessels required to
support a Taiwan invasion is debated; it depends on attrition rates, weather,
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loading and unloading times, the use of civilian shipping, availability of
off-loading infrastructure in Taiwan, Taiwan’s will to resist, and other factors
72
both physical and subjective. Regardless, it is apparent that China has not forsaken an invasion option and has the ability to develop rapidly additional amphibious forces.
Rethinking Taiwan’s Defenses
Taiwan can do little to prevent a Chinese bombardment by many hundreds, even
thousands, of precision-guided munitions. Taipei might have a better payoff,
therefore, in seeking not to defeat the incoming warheads but to prevent the attack from achieving its objectives. For instance, one technologically unsophisticated and relatively affordable measure would be to harden key civil and military
facilities—burying them or constructing concrete shelters that can withstand
73
multiple direct hits. This would be especially important for civilian leadership
facilities, military command posts, and communications systems. It could even
be done for Taiwan’s three Patriot interceptor sites, which, Google Earth reveals,
are in the open. Keeping the launchers and radars in caves or hardened bunkers
would cause Beijing to devote more warheads to them. Also, having survived
the initial bombardment, the launchers could be rolled out to protect against
follow-on harassment strikes by SRBMs, cruise missiles, and tactical aircraft.
The same logic would further suggest redundancy of critical infrastructure—such as food and water distribution systems, medical services, wartime
command and control, warning radars, or civil defense information networks.
However, Taiwan’s electrical grid is particularly vulnerable. For example, the
magnitude 7.6 earthquake that struck central Taiwan on 21 September 1999 resulted in a complete loss of electricity in the northern half of the island. A major
cause was heavy damage to the Chungliao electrical substation, “a major hub in
the island’s high voltage transmission network that directs 45% of the north’s
74
power demand.” Attacks on this attractive target could be resisted either by
distribution redundancy or emergency generators (with fuel) to supply vital
networks and facilities during and after a bombardment. Tax incentives or
75
building-code revisions could help create such capacity.
As a further example, Taiwan could complicate China’s targeting. Decoys
are an excellent and affordable way to do so. In 1999 Serbia reportedly misled
many NATO precision-guided munitions with such primitive ruses as simu76
lated tanks made of wood and tarpaulins. Taiwan could complicate Beijing’s
targeting options with radar emitters that seduce homing antiradiation missiles, inflatable “missile launchers,” and the like. Properly done, these measures
could cause the Second Artillery to waste a large percentage of its warheads on
false targets.
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Another worthwhile alternative to trying to shoot down ballistic warheads
would be making critical targets mobile. Fixed targets are relatively easy to locate and destroy with precision weaponry (unless buried or hardened), but
mobile targets are not, as the United States discovered in its unsuccessful hunt
77
for Scuds in the Iraqi western desert during the first Gulf War. An option
would be for Taiwan to move its Patriot radars frequently between several sites.
For its part, the navy could consider frequently shifting its ships’ berths, increasing the time they spend at sea, or even anchoring them in its ports, especially in
78
time of heightened tensions. Another option would be hardened pens for missile patrol craft, in which they might survive an initial SRBM attack.79 Taipei
could also rotate its fighters between airfields or between hardened shelters, in a
high-stakes analogy to three-card monte. Future weapons acquisitions could
emphasize mobility and concealment.
Beijing’s short-range ballistic missiles are highly accurate, but they are not in80
finite in either destructive power or number. In the face of such passive defenses they might well fail, however many struck targets, to achieve the true
purpose for which they were fired—destruction of Taiwan’s ability, or willingness, to resist “regime change.”
Under existing conditions, however, a surprise long-range precision bombardment would likely cost Taiwan its ability to fly useful numbers of tactical
aircraft in a coordinated manner or to sortie its navy. This prospect has important implications. For one, it suggests that additional tactical fixed-wing aircraft
requiring long runways would not be a wise investment. If their mission would
be countering invasion and (more important) preventing the PRC from using
its own aircraft in a bombardment, invasion, or blockade, Taiwan would do
better to invest more in mobile SAM systems. For instance, Taiwan reportedly
81
has 162 medium-range Improved Hawk missiles but as few as five launchers.
The surface-launched advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (SLAMRAAM),
a truck-mounted version of the highly capable AIM-120 AMRAAM, if acquired
and integrated with existing systems, would significantly enhance Taiwan’s
82
antiair capability. Taiwan could enhance its short-range man-portable and
truck-mounted air-defense systems, such as the Stinger, Avenger (a truck-borne
Stinger), and Chaparral; they might be stored in hardened or disguised shelters
and frequently moved between them. These steps would greatly complicate targeting and help deny China air superiority in the aftermath of a major bombardment. On this view, further investments in fixed-site surface-to-air missiles, such
as Taiwan’s silo-based Sky Bow 1, would seem unwise due to their vulnerability to
precision-guided munitions, unless they can withstand multiple direct hits.
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REPELLING AN INVASION
An all-out Chinese campaign to topple the Taiwan government might combine
bombardment with invasion. If Taiwan’s navy and air force were neutralized or
destroyed by the bombardment, the army would have to repulse or defeat an invasion alone. There are several weapons—all affordable and unambiguously
defensive in nature—that, if purchased, could greatly improve its chances of
doing so.
At the top of this list are mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs),
such as truck-mounted Harpoons. A fairly small number of these missiles
would likely devastate China’s armor-carrying amphibious shipping, which
would have to come well within range, and then stop, to disembark the vehicles. Recent naval history strongly suggests that a vessel loaded with tanks or
armored personnel carriers could be sunk or put out of action by a single
five-hundred-pound (or lighter) high-explosive warhead, such as cruise mis83
siles deliver. Thus far, no Chinese amphibious vessel has a robust anti–cruise
84
missile capability. Cruise missiles’ targets could be acquired by mobile ra85
dars. Best of all, CDCMs could greatly enhance Taiwan’s ability to destroy an
86
invasion force without third-party assistance.
A second class of weaponry that would be highly effective in repelling an invasion comprises attack helicopters, such as the Apache AH-64D. Taiwan, recognizing the utility of helicopters, has sixty-three AH-1A Super Cobras and has set
in motion an initiative to buy thirty Apaches in 2008 from the United States for
87
an estimated U.S. $2.26 billion. These aircraft would be highly effective against
armor that approached in landing craft or got ashore, if adequately protected
during the preparatory bombardment. Additionally, helicopters’ ability to fly
low affords a degree of immunity to long-range surface-to-air missiles.
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is another truck-mounted
weapon that might be appropriate for Taiwan. These mobile launchers could be
readily hidden or sheltered. Equipped with appropriate rockets, their long-range
88
precision fire could greatly weaken any PLA toeholds. They might do so even if
key bridges or roads were impassable; a handful of MLRS sites could cover the
entire island. Advanced tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons should not be left
off this list of effective hardware, but Taiwan already has sizable stocks of most of
them.
Another hardware recommendation, less strictly associated with ground warfare, involves surf-zone sea mines. These weapons, designed for waters less than
ten feet deep, are extraordinarily difficult to counter and would bedevil the planning or execution of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A former commandant of
the U.S. Marine Corps, General James L. Jones, stated in 2002 that “the inability
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to clear mines from the surf zone is the ‘Achilles’ heel of our maneuver force.’”
U.S. Navy mine warfare officers also attest to their effectiveness and to the speed
90
and ease of deploying them. Since they are lightweight and portable, shallowwater mines can be quickly and easily moved from secure bunkers to where they
are needed. They are also quite inexpensive, relative to many of the other weapons systems Taiwan might choose.
None of these weapons would be effective if Taiwan’s army were not highly
trained or motivated. Unfortunately, however, its conscript ground forces reportedly “suffer from low morale, a poor NCO [noncommissioned officer] program and poorly maintained equipment.”91 Also, Taiwan’s reserve forces are very
92
weak; conscripts serve only fourteen months before entering the reserves. In
any case, conscript-based armies are poorly suited to the high-technology combat that would characterize an invasion attempt by the PRC. These problems are
no doubt rooted in structural, social, and political issues beyond the scope of
this article. However, it should be pointed out briefly that the aim of thwarting
the ultimate objectives of a PRC attack (or better, thereby discouraging Beijing
from the attempt) would be best served by an all-volunteer, highly professional
and highly trained army. An all-volunteer army, though consistent with the
93
stated desires of many elected officials, could not be developed quickly. It
would increase personnel costs, but it would also increase the ground force’s deterrent value, since it would reduce the likelihood of total collapse at the beginning of hostilities, which numerous informed observers believe is a real
94
possibility.
WITHSTANDING A BLOCKADE
If Taiwan’s military and leadership were to ride out a bombardment and repel an
invasion, China might then consider an extended blockade designed to prevent
Taiwan from importing energy.95 The Republic of China would be acutely vulnerable to such an action, since it imports over 98 percent of its energy requirements. All these fuels pass through easily identifiable bottlenecks, including
off-loading terminals and processing locations that would be susceptible to de96
struction or mining. Imported energy is also carried on easily identifiable ship
types, which could be isolated, diverted, or even sunk. Additionally, Taiwan’s refiners are required only to maintain crude oil stocks equivalent to thirty days’
97
demand. This all suggests that an energy blockade’s effects would be felt very
quickly throughout Taiwan, and could be severe.
One wonders how long Taipei could resist Beijing’s demands under such conditions. It is equally unclear how a blockade that was preceded by a long-range
precision bombardment could be countered, whatever defensive military
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options Taiwan pursues. A partial solution might lie in the civil, rather than military, sphere. Specifically, Taiwan could prepare for a blockade by stockpiling
critical energy, food, and medical supplies and planning for rationing and finan98
cial contingencies. Such preparations would reassure Taiwan’s leadership and
citizenry that they could withstand a blockade, thus reducing the likelihood of
panic and early capitulation. A second objective of comprehensive preparations
and plans would be to delay significantly the point when shortages would force
99
Taipei to concede.
Perhaps most important, the United States could use the interim to deliberate
how best to respond. For instance, Washington could withhold the possibility of
intervention as leverage to induce Taipei to behave within acceptable parameters, both before and during crises. With the luxury of time, the United States
might find ways to assist that avoided direct military conflict with China—for
example, supplying critical military material via airlift, much as the Nixon administration did for Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or by shipping oil
to Taiwan on reflagged, escorted tankers. The United States might, conversely, decide to intervene with conventional force in an overwhelming but carefully phased
manner that took advantage of asymmetrical American advantages. A standing
realization by China that it could well be defeated in such a contingency would
significantly contribute to deterrence.
THE PORCUPINE REPUBLIC
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China either already has or shortly
will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan’s air force and eliminate the
navy at a time of its own choosing. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan’s
defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of diesel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised.
Diesel submarines are poor antisubmarine platforms, since with their low
speed and limited underwater endurance they simply cannot search quickly
large volumes of ocean for quiet submarines. These physical restrictions also
limit their versatility as antisurface platforms. They are, for all practical purposes, four-knot minefields. At a cost of over U.S. $1.5 billion each and with indeterminate delivery dates, conventional submarines also carry significant
opportunity costs, as some in Taipei clearly recognize. Finally, submarines are
no more likely than other naval ships tied up at exposed piers to survive the
opening salvo of a war with China.
Taiwan’s apparent decision to purchase up to twelve submarine-hunting
P-3C aircraft is similarly brought into question. Although these planes can collect valuable information during peacetime and in crisis, in wartime they would
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be sitting ducks while on the ground (though hardened shelters might protect
P-3s) and aloft would require uncontested air superiority to have any chance of
100
accomplishing their mission. In any case, Taipei cannot protect its runways.
Patriot surface-to-air missiles have some utility against short-range ballistic
missiles, but China already has the means to defeat this expensive air-defense
system.
The implication is that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and
building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In
that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bombardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and
defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in
fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses.
Others, however, would entail substantial shifts that some in Taiwan’s navy and
air force would doubtless oppose. Air force leaders would be understandably
loath to admit that their fighters cannot defend Taiwan’s skies; their navy counterparts might similarly resist suggestions that their fleet is acutely vulnerable in
port. Both services’ political champions would certainly challenge the implications of this article’s analysis. So too would the arms manufacturers who stand to
benefit from the sale of aircraft, ships, and supporting systems to Taiwan.
Yet under present conditions it is doubtful that the people and government of
Taiwan could withstand a determined PRC assault for long. A hasty American
military intervention would be Taiwan’s only hope, but only at the risk of strategic miscalculation and nuclear escalation. A “porcupine” strategy—a Taiwan
that was patently useless to attack—would obviate the need; it would also make a
determined Taipei conspicuously able to deny the objective of a bombardment
or defeat an invasion, thus deterring either scenario. Ability to resist a full-scale
campaign—long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade—for a
substantial amount of time would allow its potential allies to shape their responses carefully. Above all, demonstrable Taiwanese resilience would diminish
Beijing’s prior confidence in success, strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and re101
duce the risk of the United States being dragged into a conflict with China.
Meanwhile, a porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequivocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market
only for defensive systems. Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for
fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint
communiqué declaring that it would “not exceed, either in qualitative or in
quantitative terms, the level of those [arms] supplied in recent years . . . and that
it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of
102
time, to a final resolution.”
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Finally, and most important, a porcupine approach would shift the responsibility for Taiwan’s defense to Taiwan, rendering U.S. intervention in a
cross-strait battle a last resort instead of the first response. Many observers believe that Taiwan today relies unduly on a perceived American security guarantee and does not do enough to provide for its own defense. Yet since 2000 the
Kuomintang and the Democratic People’s Party have not framed a defense debate that could produce the open, honest appraisal that is desperately needed if
domestic consensus on a viable defense is to be achieved. A Taiwan that China
perceived could be attacked and damaged but not defeated, at least without unacceptably high costs and risks, would enjoy better relations with the United
States and neutralize the threat posed by many of China’s recently acquired military capabilities. Unfortunately, political gridlock in Taipei stands in the way of
any such hopes. It is not that Taiwan does not do enough to construct a viable
defense but that it is not doing the right things.
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